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Regulating misleading political advertising on online platforms: an example of regulatory mercantilism in digital policy

Benjamin Farrand

Policy Studies, 2024, vol. 45, issue 5, 730-749

Abstract: Since its Joint Communication on Hybrid Threats, the EU has publicly recognized the risks to its security posed by non-traditional means aimed at undermining its legitimacy. The propagation of disinformation including misleading political advertising serves as a key example of how the Commission’s perception of the EU’s vulnerability to hybrid threats in times of geopolitical instability is shaping its regulatory policies. This article uses the framework of regulatory mercantilism, which argues that in conditions of perceived vulnerability, a state-like actor will reassert regulatory control based on a security logic in areas previously characterized by self-regulatory regimes. This article considers the Commission’s 2019–2024 priorities, and how the spheres of technology, security, and democracy policies are intersecting as a response to hybrid threats. As a result, online platform governance in the EU is being substantially restructured with a move from systems of self-regulation to co-regulation backed by sanction as a means of combating hybrid threats online. The Commission’s “taking back control” from platforms in the context of a digital sovereignty agenda serves as an example of regulatory mercantilism in digital policy, which sees the Commission seek to promote regulatory strength in response to perceived vulnerability.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/01442872.2023.2258810

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