A Preference for Deference: reforming the military's intelligence role in Argentina, Chile and Peru

Gregory Weeks

Third World Quarterly, 2008, vol. 29, issue 1, 45-61

Abstract: In the past decade an effort to reform the military's role in defence institutions such as intelligence services has been underway across Latin America. Utilising the cases of Argentina, Chile and Peru, this article will argue that reform has occurred, but has been limited in terms of expanding civilian authority, and will offer a means of understanding the dynamics of intelligence reform. In particular, incentives for civilians to pursue complicated reform have been absent. The military's proven ability to operate its own intelligence agencies constitutes a disincentive. To examine the dynamics of reform, the analysis centres on three variables: the number of institutions involved in overseeing intelligence, the degree of presidential control, and whether military intelligence activities are overseen by the civilian government.

Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1080/01436590701726467

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