The Logic of Warlord Politics

Gordon Mccormick and Lindsay Fritz

Third World Quarterly, 2009, vol. 30, issue 1, 81-112

Abstract: This article offers an initial framework for a future theory of warlord politics using a simple game theoretic approach. We address the topic abstractly rather than empirically to develop a set of testable propositions across the wide range of warlord regimes. We discuss the reciprocal military and economic foundations of warlord domination, the structural logic of warlord politics, the stability of warlord regimes, and the circumstances that can be expected to lead to the formation and dissolution of warlord coalitions. We offer a conceptual introduction to these topics and lay the groundwork for a more systematic treatment of these and related themes in subsequent work.

Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1080/01436590802622391

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