Inclusive Elite Bargains and the Dilemma of Unproductive Peace: a Zambian case study

Stefan Lindemann

Third World Quarterly, 2011, vol. 32, issue 10, 1843-1869

Abstract: This article seeks to contribute to recent debates on the link between political settlements and state building. It proposes a theoretical framework that centres on the alternative concept of ‘elite bargain’ and suggests that inclusive elite bargains can be expected to facilitate both peace and economic development. Yet a detailed case study of elite bargains in Zambia shows that all good things do not always go together. While inclusive elite bargains have indeed helped to avoid civil war, they have often constrained economic development—a dilemma of unproductive peace.

Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2011.610585

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