Corruption in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: a deal among friends
Roberto Belloni and
Francesco Strazzari
Third World Quarterly, 2014, vol. 35, issue 5, 855-871
Abstract:
Since the late 1990s international state builders have paid increasing attention to fighting corruption in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. On the surface this effort has brought significant results, since both countries have adopted legal frameworks modelled on the best practices of Western democracies. In practice, however, corruption remains rampant. This disappointing outcome has several explanations: in reviewing the empirical evidence we consider the two countries as cases involving heavily assisted transition from both socialism and war, highlighting how collusive practices between political and criminal interests have played a role in establishing formally liberal but substantively ‘hybrid’ institutions. We argue that the spread of corruption has been implicitly legitimised by international actors, who have pressured local parties to accept the formal architecture of good governance, including anti-corruption legislation, while turning a blind eye to those extra-legal structures and practices perceived as functional to political stability.
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/01436597.2014.921434 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ctwqxx:v:35:y:2014:i:5:p:855-871
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/ctwq20
DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2014.921434
Access Statistics for this article
Third World Quarterly is currently edited by Shahid Qadir
More articles in Third World Quarterly from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().