An analysis of the Washington naval agreements and the economic provisions of arms control theory

Cassady Craft

Defence and Peace Economics, 2000, vol. 11, issue 1, 127-148

Abstract: During the Cold War, two contending hypotheses dominated theories concerning the economic impact of anus control. The first suggested that when certain prerequisites were fulfilled, arms control agreements served to promote lasting reduction in military spending. The second asserted that instead of promoting savings, arms control encouraged diversion of resources to more advanced and expensive weapons, thus driving defense spending higher. Through the examination of the impact of the Washington Naval Agreements on naval expenditure during the 1920s, this paper provides empirical evidence to support the latter of these competing hypotheses. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan all realized economic savings after signing the Washington Naval Agreements. However, these savings soon eroded as the powers developed more advanced weapons-systems.

Keywords: Arms control; Defense expenditures; Arms race (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1080/10430710008404943

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