Arms Races

Michael Intriljgator and Dagobert Brito

Defence and Peace Economics, 2000, vol. 11, issue 1, 45-54

Abstract: Recent developments in arms races and their theoretical analysis are treated, including the changing nature of arms races and their impacts on arms expenditure and international stability. The dominant East-West arms race of the Cold War has ended, but arms races still exist, and it is likely that even greater instabilities exist after the Cold War. Future analyses must take account of both increasing returns to scale in production and sophisticated projections of weapons levels. Recent results from the theory of repeated games, including rational learning, may provide the needed foundation for a new paradigm for the arms race.

Keywords: Arms race; Arms expenditure; Increasing returns; International stability; Rational learning; Repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1080/10430710008404938

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