European defence: The cost of partial integration
Marc Guyot and
Radu Vranceanu
Defence and Peace Economics, 2001, vol. 12, issue 2, 157-174
Abstract:
In the last decade, European defence has undergone impressive changes. Military alliances between EU member countries have strengthened, and a European defence industrial base is building up. But in a paradoxical way, European countries look less capable of coping with important military crises, and their defence budgets are plunging. This paper proposes an explanation for this changing configuration, considering the case of the decentralized production of a public good with cross-border spillin effects. In this context, increased reliability on allies may lead one country to lower defence expenditures and supply. Citizens would welcome an increase in defence production, but this outcome might be achieved only by a centralized production of defence services. A temporary pragmatic solution would consist in assigning appropriate minimum defence spending targets to EU member countries.
Keywords: European Union; Defence; Public good; Spillin effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1080/10430710108404982
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