Better weapons or better troops?

Jonathan Lipow and Eli Feinerman

Defence and Peace Economics, 2001, vol. 12, issue 4, 271-284

Abstract: Many observers of Israel's defense resource allocation process believe that insufficient resources are devoted to troop quality, while excessive resources are devoted to weapon quality. In this paper, we offer a potential explanation for this phenomenon. In our example, officers seek to signal their ability through their budgeting choices. Signaling behavior, combined with the timing and informational structure of defense decision-making, results in a sub-optimal allocation of resources to training and troop quality.

Keywords: Military budget; Officer reputation; Weapon quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1080/10430710108404988

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