The internal control constraint on compliance

Emmanuel Athanassiou

Defence and Peace Economics, 2003, vol. 14, issue 6, 413-424

Abstract: Compliance to non-violent norms of collective behaviour may be contingent on the internal political stability of a state. If external developments give rise to economic incentives for agents to change their allegiance, increasing international tension may be a strategy employed in order to produce counter-incentives. A model based on the theory of investment under uncertainty is developed to examine this issue. Increases in tension will offset incentives created by growth opportunities to switch employment and hence political allegiance. The proportion of incentive rewards as compared to position-specific rents in an economy turns out to be crucial to the behaviour of the model. The model allows various policy options, such as embargoes to be analysed.

Keywords: Investment Uncertainty; Compliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1080/1024269032000085189

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