SUICIDAL TERRORISM AND DISCRIMINATORY SCREENING: AN EFFICIENCY-EQUITY TRADE-OFF

James Yetman

Defence and Peace Economics, 2004, vol. 15, issue 3, 221-230

Abstract: Recent world events have cast a spotlight on what role, if any, discriminatory screening should play in aircraft security. This paper argues that if observable characteristics indicate differing probabilities of committing acts of terrorism, then following a non-discriminatory screening policy that fails to utilize those observable characteristics may be pareto-dominated by a screening policy that discriminates based on observable characteristics, even if agents are risk-neutral.

Keywords: Terrorism; Discriminatory screening; Racial profiling; Pareto optimality; K43; L93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1080/1024269042000189264

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