Aid versus sanctions for taming oppressors: theory and case study of the Iraqi Kurds

Jean-Paul Azam () and Tahsin Saadi-Sedik
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Tahsin Saadi Sedik ()

Defence and Peace Economics, 2004, vol. 15, issue 4, 343-364

Abstract: We model an oppressor aiming at victimizing an excluded group in his country, with two main variants. A foreign power affects his behaviour using either conditional aid, subject to the dictator's participation constraint, or the threat of sanctions, broadly defined, subject to the credibility constraint. The choice between the two is either determined by the latter, or by their relative cost. Aid is preferred when the threat of sanctions is ineffective, and sanctions are too expensive. Sanctions might be imposed, if the threat is ineffective. A case study of the Iraqi Kurds after Iraq was subject to sanctions is presented.

Keywords: Aid; Sanctions; Threats; Oppressors; Credibility; Iraqi Kurds JEL: N40-N45-O19-P45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1080/1024269042000201935

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