The effect of deployment on first- and second-term re-enlistment in the US active duty force

James Hosek and Mark Totten

Defence and Peace Economics, 2004, vol. 15, issue 5, 433-451

Abstract: Why should deployment affect re-enlistment? In our model, members enter the military with naive beliefs about deployment and use actual deployment experience to update their beliefs and revise their expected utility of re-enlisting. Empirically, re-enlistment is related to the type and number of deployments, consistent with the learning model. Non-hostile deployment increases first-term re-enlistment but hostile deployment has little effect except for the Army, where the effect is positive. Both types increase second-term re-enlistment. Interestingly, first-term members with dependants tend to respond to deployment like second-term members. In addition, deployment acts directly to affect re-enlistment, not indirectly through time to promotion.

Keywords: Deployment; Re-enlistment; Bayesian learning; Expected utility; JEL codes: J22; J24; J28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1080/10242690420001683337

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