An economic analysis of the un peacekeeping assessment system

Hirofumi Shimizu

Defence and Peace Economics, 2005, vol. 16, issue 1, 1-18

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects on UN member states' contribution incentives of an assessment system employed by the United Nations for the financing of its peacekeeping operations. We argue that formal responsibilities placed on a member state by an assessment system increase the damage the country suffers when it under-contributes. The possibility of increasing each member state's contributions by redistributing its assessments across peacekeeping operations is also studied. It is shown that the possibility exists when the undercontributor-specific damage is a function of the arrears-to-assessment ratio, and not of simple arrears.

Keywords: Public goods; Burden sharing; Joint product model; United Nations; Peacekeeping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1080/1024269052000323515

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