TERROR SUPPORT AND RECRUITMENT

Joao Faria and Daniel Arce

Defence and Peace Economics, 2005, vol. 16, issue 4, 263-273

Abstract: We analyse a dynamic model linking terrorist activities to popular support through a recruitment mechanism. It is shown that anti-terrorism policies focusing on liberal ideals (reducing repression, increasing economic opportunity) are effective at abating recruitment, thereby affecting the dynamic stability of terrorist attacks. In contrast, deterrence's comparative advantage is in counteracting hard-core members, implying that terror eradication itself requires an emphasis on hard-core membership, rather than popular support for terror activities.

Keywords: Terrorist networks; Anti-terrorist policies; Terrorist recruitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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DOI: 10.1080/1024269052000344855

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