THE 'PRICE' OF TERRORISM

Peter Phillips

Defence and Peace Economics, 2005, vol. 16, issue 6, 403-414

Abstract: Security measures are said to increase the price of terrorism. This price has not been hitherto defined in an economically meaningful way. This paper provides a precise definition by treating the terrorists' resource endowment as a parcel of contingent claims to political influence with a price equal to the summed value of those contingent claims in potential states of the world. Equipped with this definition, an equilibrium model of the price of terrorism is deployed. Important insights are gained into the effect of terrorists' risk aversion at the level of the price of terrorism in different states of the world and the theoretical conclusion is reached that higher security is associated with a lower price of terrorism rather than a higher price. The implications for policy are discussed.

Keywords: Terrorism; Price of terrorism; Resource endowment; Contingent claims; Political influence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1080/10242690500115931

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