DETERRENCE IN THE COLD WAR AND THE 'WAR ON TERROR'

David Levine and Robert Levine

Defence and Peace Economics, 2006, vol. 17, issue 6, 605-617

Abstract: We examine how the theory of deterrence differs from a Cold-War type of setting to a War-on-Terror type of setting. Our central conclusion is that deterrence of terrorist states should resemble Cold War deterrence. Deterring terrorist groups is more difficult. In either case, failure of deterrence will have far less traumatic consequences than during the Cold War, unless we ourselves are overcome by fear.

Keywords: Terrorism; Cold war; Game theory; Deterence; Rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Working Paper: Deterrence in the Cold War and the War on Terror (2006)
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DOI: 10.1080/10242690601025526

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