EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

REVERSAL OF MISFORTUNE WHEN PROVIDING FOR ADVERSITY

Martin McGuire () and Gary Becker

Defence and Peace Economics, 2006, vol. 17, issue 6, 619-643

Abstract: Often an economic agent dissatisfied with an endowed distribution of utilities desires to optimize this distribution by transferring income or resources across individuals or states of the world. This multi-state optimization theme recurs in a wide variety of economic contexts, ranging across taxation and income distribution, international trade and market disruption, labor contracts and unemployment insurance, Rawlsian design of social contracts, provision for retirement, and many others. Because analyses of such topics are frequently so context driven, the generality of this theme seems to have gone unnoticed and, of a particular paradoxical result, unappreciated. One example of this paradox is how lump-sum distribution in a first best environment will reverse the preference rankings of the endowed distribution of utilities - after redistribution the originally 'bad' outcomes become preferred to originally better ones. Or as another example, if fair insurance is available, the rational resource owner will buy so much insurance that the otherwise 'bad' contingency becomes preferred. This paper examines the underlying structure common to such contexts.

Keywords: Provision for adversity; Insurance; Income redistribution; Retirement; Trade interruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10242690601025559 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:defpea:v:17:y:2006:i:6:p:619-643

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GDPE20

DOI: 10.1080/10242690601025559

Access Statistics for this article

Defence and Peace Economics is currently edited by Professor Keith Hartley

More articles in Defence and Peace Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:17:y:2006:i:6:p:619-643