BARGAINING VERSUS FIGHTING

Stergios Skaperdas

Defence and Peace Economics, 2006, vol. 17, issue 6, 657-676

Abstract: I examine the determinants of conflict and settlement by embedding probabilistic contests in a bargaining framework. Different costly enforcement efforts (e.g. arming, litigation expenditures) induce different disagreement points and Pareto frontiers. After examining the incentives for settlement, I demonstrate how different division rules and bargaining norms have real, economic effects. I then analyze some sources of conflict. I emphasize long-term, strategic considerations by examining an illustrative model and discussing particular historical examples.

Keywords: Conflict; Negotiation; War; Settlement; Litigation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Working Paper: Bargaining Versus Fighting (2006)
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DOI: 10.1080/10242690601025617

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