PREDATORY BEHAVIOR OF GOVERNMENTS: THE CASE OF MASS KILLING
Sang Hoo Bae () and
Defence and Peace Economics, 2008, vol. 19, issue 2, 107-125
In this paper we seek to answer the question: why do governments engage in mass killing? Tullock (1974) gives gain or avoidance of loss as the motive. We construct a three-stage theoretic framework to explain the choice of a ruler of a country. The conditions that must be met for a mass killing regime to win over alternative regimes are derived. Using the COW project data over the period 1816-1997, we estimate two models: negative binomial regression of number of battle-related deaths and a probit model for the choice of mass killing. The paper concludes with suggestions for data collections and further research.
Keywords: Mass killing; Vertical differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:defpea:v:19:y:2008:i:2:p:107-125
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