PREDATORY BEHAVIOR OF GOVERNMENTS: THE CASE OF MASS KILLING

Sang Hoo Bae () and Attiat Ott

Defence and Peace Economics, 2008, vol. 19, issue 2, 107-125

Abstract: In this paper we seek to answer the question: why do governments engage in mass killing? Tullock (1974) gives gain or avoidance of loss as the motive. We construct a three-stage theoretic framework to explain the choice of a ruler of a country. The conditions that must be met for a mass killing regime to win over alternative regimes are derived. Using the COW project data over the period 1816-1997, we estimate two models: negative binomial regression of number of battle-related deaths and a probit model for the choice of mass killing. The paper concludes with suggestions for data collections and further research.

Keywords: Mass killing; Vertical differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1080/10242690701516846

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