DEFENSIVE COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Kevin Siqueira and Todd Sandler

Defence and Peace Economics, 2008, vol. 19, issue 6, 405-413

Abstract: Unlike most of the literature, this paper includes domestic political considerations in which two countries must decide defensive countermeasures against a common terrorist threat. A delegation problem arises as voters strategically choose a policymaker whose preferences differ from their own. As a consequence, countries limit the presumed oversupply of defensive countermeasures. Thus, the inclusion of domestic politics gives a new perspective on counterterrorism. The timing of elections is also shown to make a difference.

Keywords: Terrorism; Externalities; Counterterrorism; Delegation problem; Domestic politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1080/10242690701775483

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