WHEN AND HOW THE FIGHTING STOPS: EXPLAINING THE DURATION AND OUTCOME OF CIVIL WARS

Patrick Brandt, T. David Mason, Mehmet Gurses, Nicolai Petrovsky and Dagmar Radin

Defence and Peace Economics, 2008, vol. 19, issue 6, 415-434

Abstract: Previous research has shown that the duration of a civil war is in part a function of how it ends: in government victory, rebel victory, or negotiated settlement. We present a model of how protagonists in a civil war choose to stop fighting. Hypotheses derived from this theory relate the duration of a civil war to its outcome as well as characteristics of the civil war and the civil war nation. Findings from a competing risk model reveal that the effects of predictors on duration vary according to whether the conflict ended in government victory, rebel victory, or negotiated settlement.

Keywords: Civil war; Conflict resolution; Duration; Competing risks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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DOI: 10.1080/10242690701823267

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