ARMY RE-ENLISTMENT DURING OIF/OEF: BONUSES, DEPLOYMENT, AND STOP-LOSS

Curtis Simon and John Warner

Defence and Peace Economics, 2010, vol. 21, issue 5-6, 507-527

Abstract: In 2004, stretched by wartime deployments, the US Army countered declining retention by increasing re-enlistment bonuses and implementing stop-loss to prevent soldiers from separating at the end of their enlistment. We estimate the effects of bonuses, deployment, and stop-loss on re-enlistment between FY 2002 and 2006. We estimate that the baseline propensity to re-enlist fell by 20%. However, we find that deployed soldiers are more likely to re-enlist and that the estimated effects of re-enlistment bonuses are similar to those estimated in peacetime. We evaluate the reasons for our findings, and calculate the cost effectiveness of re-enlistment bonuses.

Keywords: Re-enlistment; Deployment; Bonuses (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2010.513488

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