SECRECY AND DECEPTION AT EQUILIBRIUM, WITH APPLICATIONS TO ANTI-TERRORISM RESOURCE ALLOCATION

Jun Zhuang () and Vicki Bier

Defence and Peace Economics, 2011, vol. 22, issue 1, 43-61

Abstract: In this work, we develop a game-theoretic model for whether and how a first mover should disclose her resource allocation. Our model allows us to explore whether the first mover should disclose correct information about her resource allocation, incorrect information, or no information. Although we study secrecy and deception specifically in the homeland-security context where the first mover is assumed to be the defender, our work can also provide insights in other contexts, such as business competition.

Keywords: Secrecy and deception; Truthful disclosure; Homeland security; Resource allocation; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2010.491668

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