INTRA-GROUP COMPETITION AND INTER-GROUP CONFLICT: AN APPLICATION TO NORTHERN IRELAND

Colin Jennings

Defence and Peace Economics, 2011, vol. 22, issue 1, 63-83

Abstract: This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflict settings. The 'credibility rationale', argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The 'bargaining rationale' predicts that while doves are more likely to secure peace, post-conflict hawks may be rationally selected. The 'social psychological rationale' captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity. Dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the 'expressive rationale' predicts that regardless of the underlying nature of the game the large group nature of decision-making in rendering individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.

Keywords: Conflict; Leadership; Strategic delegation; Consociation; Northern Ireland (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10242694.2010.491672 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland (2008)
Working Paper: Intra-Group Competition and Inter-Group Conflict: An Application to Northern Ireland (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:defpea:v:22:y:2011:i:1:p:63-83

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GDPE20

DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2010.491672

Access Statistics for this article

Defence and Peace Economics is currently edited by Professor Keith Hartley

More articles in Defence and Peace Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().