SLOWING DOWN TO KEEP THE LEAD IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

Leo Blanken and Jason Lepore

Defence and Peace Economics, 2011, vol. 22, issue 3, 317-334

Abstract: We develop a model of military technology competition among states. States can choose to introduce new military technology, mimic rivals' level of technology, or withdraw from the contest. States can choose to implement any level of technology within their current feasible technologies. We find that states with significant technological leads should sometimes withhold new technologies, only strategically releasing them to trump rivals' efforts. We develop the model by refining Admiral Jackie Fisher's roughly articulated concept of 'plunging'. We then use this refined argument to reanalyze the case of naval rivalries among European powers between the Crimean War and the First World War. Finally, we conclude by discussing the model's implications for current US military force structure planning.

Keywords: technology diffusion; quolitative arms races; conventional force structure planning; weapons development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2010.491675

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