Stopping Suicide Attacks: Optimal Strategies and Unintended Consequences

Michael McBride () and Gary Richardson

Defence and Peace Economics, 2012, vol. 23, issue 5, 413-429

Abstract: Governments fighting terrorists have many tactical options, yet these options often yield unintended and counterproductive consequences. This paper models a terrorist organization, a religious group from which the terrorists recruit suicide bombers, and the society in which the terrotists are imbedded. The model illuminates how the choice of counterterrorist tactics influences the incidence of attacks, paying particular attention to the direct and indirect (unintended) consequences of the government's actions. The ultimate goal of this work is to identify the best way to stop terrorist attacks.

Date: 2012
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Working Paper: Stopping Suicide Attacks: Optimal Strategies and Unintended Consequences (2010)
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2011.627758

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