Counterterrorism And Its Impact On Terror Support And Recruitment: Accounting For Backlash

Joao Faria and Daniel Arce

Defence and Peace Economics, 2012, vol. 23, issue 5, 431-445

Abstract: This article presents a dynamic model in which counterterrorism policies have the potential to generate positive public support for terrorism via a backlash that may fuel terror recruitment. For an optimizing government aiming at maximizing security, this phenomenon produces a natural bound on proactive counterterror policy that is related to the dynamic path of conflict. Moreover, terror is a persistent phenomenon that requires patience on the part of the target government for optimal counterterror policies to be realized. Finally, the potential for backlash yields insights into the need for target governments to fight an information war to change public opinion regarding its own policies and the ultimate effect of terror attacks.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2011.604930

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