Political Military Competition and Size and Composition of Government

Jimmy Teng

Defence and Peace Economics, 2014, vol. 25, issue 2, 163-175

Abstract: This paper uses a formal model to analyze the effects of political military competition among states on the size and composition of state. Great economies of scale in warfare, even distribution of military capability among contestants and greater value of contested resources generate higher level of military capacity and growth of government. If there is decreasing return to scale in state revenue generating function and provision of public intermediate inputs, then there will be an increasing size of civilian public sector relative to that of military. The paper finally studies how waves of military revolutions affected international political military competition and the size and composition of government in history.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2013.774770

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