Asymmetric information and third-party intervention in civil wars

J. Atsu Amegashie

Defence and Peace Economics, 2014, vol. 25, issue 4, 381-400

Abstract: I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally's enemy. In a signaling game, I find that if the third party is unable to give a sufficiently high assistance to her ally, then there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which the third party's expected intervention causes her ally's enemy to exert more effort than in the absence of third-party intervention; this worsens the conflict.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2013.799935

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