Defense Strategy Transition and Economic Growth Under External Predation
Taoxiong Liu and
Bihua Zhou
Defence and Peace Economics, 2015, vol. 26, issue 3, 289-309
Abstract:
This paper develops a growth model for a country under a Hobbesian environment with international conflicts where national defense is the only way to prevent external predation. Different defense strategies result in different growth paths. The long-run growth path is determined by the equilibrium of a dynamic game with three players: the external predator, the government, and the family. The equilibrium growth path can have different phases: submissive equilibrium, tolerant equilibrium, and complete protection equilibrium. Sustainable growth will endogenously induce an adjustment of the defense strategies. As the economy keeps growing, complete protection will eventually be preferred. The optimal growth path prefers to compress the length of the transitional period between incomplete protection and complete protection. Some interesting features of the transitional dynamics are exhibited by a control model with discontinuity.
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/10242694.2013.763636 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:defpea:v:26:y:2015:i:3:p:289-309
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GDPE20
DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2013.763636
Access Statistics for this article
Defence and Peace Economics is currently edited by Professor Keith Hartley
More articles in Defence and Peace Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().