Territorial contestation and repressive violence in civil war

J. M. Quinn

Defence and Peace Economics, 2015, vol. 26, issue 5, 536-554

Abstract: This study models the structural sources of variation in the use of selective (discriminate) repression within 89 civil wars fought between 1981 and 2005. The severity of repressive violence is modeled as a function of the amount of territory being contested by the insurgents. This idea is operationalized using measures of the location, size, and density of insurgency violence. The analysis finds evidence that the repressive behavior of both governments and rebel groups is linked to conflict geography. Governments violate physical integrity rights more frequently and kill more civilians the greater the overall amount of territory under contestation. Rebels kill more civilians in highly dispersed insurgencies that lack a clear epicenter.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2014.925677

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