Group support for political violence: The role of emotions and expressive choice in creating conflict or providing peace

Colin Jennings

Defence and Peace Economics, 2016, vol. 27, issue 3, 404-422

Abstract: This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence which does not provide a material benefit. Rabin’s (1993) theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be a Nash equilibrium it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrifice in choosing peace.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2014.996005

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