The lobbies’ network at the EU policy level: the case of security and defense

Fernando Ruiz, Florent Hainaut and Nathalie Schiffino

Defence and Peace Economics, 2016, vol. 27, issue 6, 774-793

Abstract: Lobbyists may not share the same interests, but they usually agree to form a link in a network which could eventually be used to spread information, to search for potential partners, to speak with one voice to decision makers. In other words, social links represent value for lobbyists because they may ultimately facilitate access. In this article, we explore the network of the Security and Defense lobbies in the EU and we describe its structure.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2015.1072376

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