The timing of third-party intervention in social conflict

Yang-Ming Chang, Zijun Luo and Yongjing Zhang

Defence and Peace Economics, 2018, vol. 29, issue 2, 91-110

Abstract: This paper analyzes how the equilibrium outcome of social conflict between factions is strategically altered by third-party intervention. We consider an intervening third party that commits financial support to one of two contending factions for reducing its cost in conflict. Within the framework of three-player sequential-move games, we investigate the questions as follows. What is the optimal intervention intensity in terms of the third party’s financial support? Is there a first-mover advantage in conflict when there is third-party intervention? Fighting against all odds, will the unsupported faction have a chance to prevail when its opponent receives third-party support? What is the optimal timing of third-party intervention? The analysis in the paper has implications for the conditions under which the strategic intervention of a third party may or may not break a conflict between factions.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2015.1126918

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