 Repression and Long-term Political LeadershipSanna Nurmikko-Metsola Defence and Peace Economics, 2020, vol. 31, issue 3, 341-360 Abstract: This paper develops a model where an incumbent may try to bribe the security forces to repress the political opposition in order to improve his/her chances of winning the elections. Such situations can be demonstrated by the cases of Cambodia, Uganda and Zimbabwe where the political leadership has used repression in and around the election times. In a collusive equilibrium, the security forces produce violence and the leader responds by giving a bribe to the former, this pair of actions taking place in each period. A collusive equilibrium exists when the bribe that a leader is prepared to pay is at least as large as the bribe that the security forces are willing to accept. We find that a harsher expected punishment (e.g. a longer prison sentence) will improve an incumbent’s incentives to collude. In contrast, security forces expecting a harsher punishment will be less likely to repress. Furthermore, we discuss the circumstances under which windfall revenue (e.g. foreign aid, resource rents) may contribute to violence and when it may prevent it. Date: 2020 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:defpea:v:31:y:2020:i:3:p:341-360 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2018.1472999 Access Statistics for this article Defence and Peace Economics is currently edited by Professor Keith Hartley More articles in Defence and Peace Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals |
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