Seeking No War, Achieving No Peace: The Conflict over the Siachen Glacier

Tommy Andersson and Conan Mukherjee

Defence and Peace Economics, 2021, vol. 32, issue 3, 253-270

Abstract: This paper models ‘no war, no peace’ situations in a game theoretical framework where two countries are engaged in a standoff over a military sector. The first main objective is to identify rational grounds for such situations and, more precisely, for the explicit equilibria that lead to such situations. It is demonstrated that both countries gain the same payoff from being in this continuous state of perpetual hostility and, moreover, that ‘no war, no peace’ situations can be explained only if the countries perceive an equal measure of military advantage from controlling the area. Given this insight, the second objective of the paper is to provide insights about how ‘no war, no peace’ situations can be resolved. Two different pathways are suggested. The first is idealistic and based on mutual trust, whereas the second is based on deterrence, involving both countries imposing a threat of using armed force against the other country in their respective military doctrines.

Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Seeking No War, Achieving No Peace: The Conflict over the Siachen Glacier (2018)
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2019.1660839

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