Why Some Rebel Organizations Attack Americans

Victor Asal, Christopher Linebarger, Amira Jadoon and J. Michael Greig

Defence and Peace Economics, 2021, vol. 32, issue 6, 708-725

Abstract: Hating America – and attacking Americans – can seem like a mandatory activity for rebels; yet, only a minority of rebel groups actually harm Americans. Under what circumstances do rebel groups target Americans? To answer these questions, we leverage the Big Allied And Dangerous 2 data – Insurgency subsample (BAAD2-I). Our model focuses on two classes of rebel motives: direct and indirect. Direct motives are those in which Americans play a central role in rebel group grievances. They include ideology, deployment of American troops, and American support for rebels’ government-based opponents. Indirect motives are those that encourage anti-American attacks because of their powerful symbolic value. This distinction speaks to ongoing policy debates within the United States about the most effective policy instruments to defeat extremism abroad. Contrary to common perceptions, we find that attacks on Americans are unrelated to group ideology. Instead, deployment of American troops and military assistance is positively associated with attacks on Americans, as is economic penetration. Conversely, rebel groups in countries with substantial exports to the US or featuring a long-term presence of American cultural artifacts are less likely to attack Americans. Our findings highlight the value of a ‘soft power’ orientation in American foreign policy.

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2021.1878320

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