The Evolution Towards the Partial Strategic Autonomy of Sweden’s Essential Security Interests

Martin Lundmark

Defence and Peace Economics, 2022, vol. 33, issue 4, 399-420

Abstract: This article describes how Sweden developed a hybrid defence-industrial infrastructure with three prioritized ‘essential strategic interests’ pointing to parts of the domestic defence industry: ‘a partial strategic autonomy’. The article focuses on Sweden’s declared three essential security interests – combat aircraft capability; underwater capabilities; and integrity-critical parts of the command, control, communication and intelligence domain (C3I). The article finds that the possibilities and ways forward for the essential security interests vary, with a general trend towards more shared and increasingly partial autonomy. Six change factors are formulated as drivers towards Sweden’s partial strategic autonomy of today: Autonomy as a result of failed internationalization; Techno-nationalist perception of Sweden leading to industrial protectionism; Strategic choice; Corporate lobbying; Export incentives leading to political support of technologies; and Europeanization of the EU defence industry. Techno-nationalism and strategic choice are the factors with the most evident impact. The overall governance of the defence industry is clear on the priority of ensuring security of supply and a high degree of autonomy regarding the three essential security interests. Other parts of the defence industry operate under globalized and more competitive conditions. In order to apply increased economic rationality and strive for shared autonomy, Sweden must increase its engagement in multilateral arms collaboration.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2021.1992713

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