Explanations of Military Spending: The Evidence from Legislators

Carlos Seiglie and Jun Xiang

Defence and Peace Economics, 2022, vol. 33, issue 4, 489-495

Abstract: While a great deal of research has examined determinants of military spending, few studies have systematically investigated how legislators vote on defense expenditures. This study fills this important gap. Based on a sample of roll-call data on defense spending from the 112th U.S. House, we estimate legislators’ ideal points through an item response model. Several interesting findings emerge. First, Republicans are more likely to favor military spending, a finding that is both statistically and substantively significant throughout our analysis. In addition, interest group campaign contributions play an important role by increasing the probability a legislator supports defense spending. Third, when a congressional district has a larger number of veterans or a lower rate of unemployment, its elected legislator is likely to favor military spending. Finally, the effect of public opinion disappears after the district demographics are controlled for.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2021.1939933

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