Prospects of Deterrence: Deterrence Theory, Representation and Evidence

Karl Sörenson

Defence and Peace Economics, 2024, vol. 35, issue 2, 145-159

Abstract: Game theoretic analysis of deterrence has been criticized for not capturing how actors realistically behave. It is alleged that prospect theoretical re-modeling provides a better foundation for a deterrence theory. The article analyzes how the strategies change when a prospect theoretical function is applied to a central deterrence game. While the probability distributions changes, it cannot alter the general dynamics. When considered together with previous research, it shows that prospect theory neither can or should replace standard assumptions when constructing a deterrence theory. However, viewed as a compliment, prospect theory expands the modeling possibilities and opens up for important new aspects.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2022.2152956

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