Verification of Peace Accords and Military Expenditures in Post-Conflict Societies

Wakako Maekawa

Defence and Peace Economics, 2024, vol. 35, issue 3, 295-319

Abstract: Why is it that some governments ending a civil war in a negotiated settlement succeed in reducing military spending while others fail? Civil wars ending in peace agreements result in relatively low military expenditures; however, not all governments succeed in the reduction. I argue that implementing a third-party verification mechanism of peace accords helps reduce military spending in post-conflict societies because the verification mechanism facilitates the peace accord implementation by enabling reciprocal implementation and by increasing the cost of noncompliance through active information flow. Implementation of peace agreements reduces threats posed by both former and outside rebel groups. This makes the government decrease the military expenditure allocated to appease internal security threats. I tested this argument using 32 civil wars with a comprehensive peace agreement between 1992 and 2011. The results indicate that initiating a verification mechanism leads to lower military spending.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2022.2158648

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