Who Restarts Violent Conflict? Post-Conflict Government Policy and Two Types of Conflict Recurrence

Tatsuya Koyama

Defence and Peace Economics, 2025, vol. 36, issue 2, 200-226

Abstract: Some internal armed conflicts recur between the same organizations, while, in others, the participating rebel groups vary with each recurrence, (i.e. they are ‘recast’). The two types of conflict recurrence (‘repeated conflicts’ and ‘recast conflicts’) should follow distinct logic because the participating rebel organizations qualitatively differ. I propose and test a game theoretic model explaining the two paths, where the government should contain former and potential rebels at the same time to prevent another war. The key feature I identify as fundamental in post-conflict settings is that former rebels are stronger but susceptible to private rewards while potential ones are weaker but difficult to buy off. Consistent with the model, my empirical analysis shows that the number of rebel factions, conflict stake, and the difference in capability between the former rebels and potential ones have differentiating effects on two distinct types of conflict recurrence.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/10242694.2024.2308473 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:defpea:v:36:y:2025:i:2:p:200-226

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GDPE20

DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2024.2308473

Access Statistics for this article

Defence and Peace Economics is currently edited by Professor Keith Hartley

More articles in Defence and Peace Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().