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Not for security only: The demand for international status and defence expenditure an introduction

Hans Kammler

Defence and Peace Economics, 1997, vol. 8, issue 1, 1-16

Abstract: The analysis of military expenditure, inside alliances as well as outside, has gained much when the original Olson-Zeckhauser approach was generalized into the joint-product model of alliances as developed by Todd Sandier and others. This model allowed, as benefits to allies determining military expenditure, not only deterrence, a pure collective good, but partially collective goods like conventional fighting power and private (country-specific) benefits. The papers in this Special Issue explore the explanatory potential of also considering the demand for positional goods, in particular great-power status, as a determinant of military expenditure. The “exploitation of the strong by the weak” characterizing NATO until the early 1970s and during the American defence buildup of 1980-1985 might also be explained by an informal leader-follower bargain between the United States and its allies who traded acceptance of American hegemony for military protection and “hegemonic stability” of the world economy.

Keywords: Positional goods; great-power status; credibility; leader-follower bargain; hegemonic stability; military expenditure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1080/10430719708404866

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