EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Costs, risks, and benefits of a global military capability for the European union

Reimund Seidelmann

Defence and Peace Economics, 1997, vol. 8, issue 1, 123-143

Abstract: This article contains estimates of the economic and political costs and risks for the build-up, maintenance, modernization, and operation of a global military power projection for the EU, which is comparable in size and effectiveness to that of the USA. Build-up costs for such a capacity are estimated as 200-400bn ECU or an increase of about 50% to the defence budgets of NATO Europe of 1995. In relative terms this would mean defence expenditures of 2.8-3.8% of GDP, which seems tolerable compared to figures of the 1970s and 1980s. For the EU budget this would mean, however, not only nearly tripling but an increase from 1.3% to 4.8% of GDP. While other economic costs are marginal, the political costs for such a fundamental change in the EU's character, for reversing political trends in defence spending, and for transferring sensitive national sovereignty to the EU and the risk for public support, party cohesion, and elections are considerable. These political costs and potential risks have to be compared with benefits of becoming a second global power, of becoming independent from US security, and from major positive effects for EU integration in general.

Keywords: European Union (EU); Common European Armaments market; common Foreign and Security Policy; european defence budgets; military capacity of EU; West European Union (WEU) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10430719708404872 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:defpea:v:8:y:1997:i:1:p:123-143

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GDPE20

DOI: 10.1080/10430719708404872

Access Statistics for this article

Defence and Peace Economics is currently edited by Professor Keith Hartley

More articles in Defence and Peace Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:8:y:1997:i:1:p:123-143