The politics of social protection expenditure and financing in southern Africa
Marianne Ulriksen
Development Southern Africa, 2013, vol. 30, issue 1, 39-53
Abstract:
Social protection is expanding in southern Africa, but consideration of its fiscal base is usually limited to affordability concerns. Little attention is paid to the different sources of revenue or how the interests of contributors to social protection may affect spending priorities. This article suggests there is a link between revenue source and social protection spending. Aid dependent countries' social protection policy is mostly determined by donors. The governments of countries that rely on natural resources or Southern African Customs Union revenue are relatively free to shape social protection policy. Only in countries that rely on domestic tax-based revenue, where the government must consider the interests of the taxpayer, is there something resembling a social contract for social protection, in which the citizens engage with their government through an exchange-based logic. This article concludes that a broad and diversified tax base is an important mechanism for creating a reciprocal relationship of this kind and thus increasing social spending.
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:deveza:v:30:y:2013:i:1:p:39-53
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DOI: 10.1080/0376835X.2013.756097
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