Cooperation versus competition in product innovation

Miguel González-Maestre and Diego Penarrubia

Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 2005, vol. 14, issue 4, 305-318

Abstract: This paper analyzes the optimal antitrust policy in the context of a patent race. In a simplified model, we identify the conditions under which allowing cooperation yields greater welfare than imposing competition. In view of our results, we discuss, critically, the current European policy towards R&D cooperation.

Keywords: Competition; Product innovation; Antitrust policy; Joint ventures; Knowledge externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1080/1043859042000269070

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