Managerial incentives for technology transfer

Derek Clark and Anita Michalsen

Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 2010, vol. 19, issue 7, 649-668

Abstract: This paper studies how a separation of ownership and management affects a firm's incentives to transfer knowledge about technology voluntarily and without payment to a rival in a Cournot duopoly. We consider a three-stage strategic delegation game, where two technologies are available; one with increasing returns to scale and the other with constant returns to scale. While the former is known to both firms, only the more advanced firm initially has access to the latter type of technology. This firm is assumed to be managerial, not only with respect to product market decisions, but also regarding the choice of whether or not to transfer technology to the rival firm. We consider the scope for, and limitations of, the use of strategic management and compare the results with those from traditional models that do not involve technology transfer and models that involve technology transfer, and no strategic management. The resulting technology choices are examined for their welfare implications, and finally we consider the transfer of technology when both firms are managerial.

Keywords: technology transfer; managerial incentives; technology adoption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10438590903128974 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ecinnt:v:19:y:2010:i:7:p:649-668

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GEIN20

DOI: 10.1080/10438590903128974

Access Statistics for this article

Economics of Innovation and New Technology is currently edited by Professor Cristiano Antonelli

More articles in Economics of Innovation and New Technology from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().