IPO underpricing and corporate innovation: evidence from China

Di Wu and Qifeng Zhao

Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 2024, vol. 33, issue 6, 866-888

Abstract: The functions of the stock market such as investment exit mechanism (IPO), interest incentive and capital allocation are beneficial for corporate to engage in innovation activities with higher risk and longer cycle, but IPO underpricing will hinder the realization of such functions. This paper uses the fixed effect model for empirical analysis and finds that the long-term innovation performance of corporate s with IPO underpricing is poor. Mechanism analysis shows that IPO underpricing corporates will have management myopia, lack of R&D enthusiasm that inhibit corporate innovation. Further analysis shows that the improvement of corporate information transparency and institutional investor field research can alleviate this negative impact can alleviate this negative impact. The conclusion of this paper aims to improve efficiency of the capital market, promote the effective pricing of the capital market, and provide certain reference significance for the relevant policies of the capital market to support the high-quality development of the real economy.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/10438599.2023.2258355

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