Strategic Process And Product Innovation

Harald Gruber

Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 1995, vol. 4, issue 1, 17-26

Abstract: The study analyzes the timing of process and product innovations. A dynamic product differentiation model illustrates strategic interaction in a duopoly. Firms use asymmetric equilibrium strategies for the adoption of innovations, i.e. innovations are adopted sequentially. The priority of process innovation over product innovation depends on the relative magnitude of the two innovations. Empirical evidence from the semiconductor industry illustrates asymmetric adoption patterns for innovations.

Keywords: Product and process innovation; game theory; semiconductor industry J.E.L. classification: L19; 031 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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DOI: 10.1080/10438599500000011

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